The “Passwordless” Back Door: Why Modern Credentials Still Fail

We’ve heard it before: “ Attackers don’t break in — they log in.”  In 2025, that’s not hyperbole — it’s the operating model. The latest threat reports tell a consistent story: stolen or misused passwords and other login credentials remain the easiest, quietest way to take over modern environments, even those boasting MFA, passkeys, and biometrics.

The Data: Credential Abuse is the Attack Path of Least Resistance

• IBM X-Force (2025) reports that credential harvesting was the top impact in 2024 incidents. In short: login credentials remain both the prize and the pry bar. IBM

  
  

• Verizon DBIR 2025 calls credential abuse the most common initial access vector this year; within Basic Web Application Attacks, about 88% of breaches involved stolen login credentials. Verizon+1

  
  

• CrowdStrike Threat Hunting Report 2025 notes 81% of hands-on-keyboard intrusions were malware-free — consistent with adversaries logging in, not dropping payloads — and documents help-desk impersonation to reset credentials and bypass MFA (e.g., SCATTERED SPIDER). CrowdStrike

  
  

That’s three independent lenses, all pointing at the same weak seam: login credentials.

Why “Modern” Access Credentials Still Collapse at the Edges

Passkeys, biometrics, authenticator apps, and push approvals are stronger authenticators than passwords — but their security stops at the point where they touch the user. Even when daily sign-in feels “passwordless,” enrollment, reset, recovery, and break-glass (i.e., emergency access processes kept in reserve when normal authentication fails) still hinge on something the user can reset — a password, a device PIN, or an admin-issued temporary code.

Biometrics gate secrets, they don’t replace them. A fingerprint or face scan only unlocks a stored credential (password, PIN, or cryptographic key). After a device restart or failed match, the fallback is always the password or PIN.

Passkeys still coexist with user-managed recovery methods. Adding a passkey doesn’t remove the password or SMS reset — those remain as back doors because the user may forget, lose, or break a device.

Enterprise MFA recovery depends on user self-service or admin trust. Microsoft’s Temporary Access Pass (TAP) and Okta’s password recovery flows exist to make life easier for users — but the same simplicity makes them exploitable for attackers.

Every one of these safety nets exists because the user ultimately controls the credential lifecycle. When the user forgets, loses, or locks themselves out, the system must fall back to something the user can reset. That fallback is what attackers exploit.

The Root Problem: User-Controlled Credentials

The industry’s language — “passwordless,” “phishing-resistant,” “unbreakable keys” — obscures a hard truth: credentials don’t fail because of cryptography, they fail because of custody.

•           Users create them.

•           Users reset them.

•           Users recover them.

•           Users lose them.

And because the system must serve the user, it must always offer a fallback — almost always a password, PIN, or reset code.

The Convenience Trap: Enrollment and Help-Desk Resets

Attackers don’t bother to break FIDO keys or reverse-engineer biometrics. They simply manipulate systems to mint them a new credential or hand them someone else’s.

•           Help-desk social engineering: Groups like SCATTERED SPIDER impersonate employees, answer enough “verification” questions, and persuade IT to reset credentials or transfer MFA tokens.

•           Temporary codes and recovery flows: Emergency access codes (like TAP) exist to serve the user — but once issued under false pretenses, they grant attackers the same trust.

•           Self-service resets: Users are conditioned to recover access via email links, SMS, or knowledge-based questions. Adversaries exploit those paths daily.

•           Active Directory compromise: AD allows hackers to create new accounts and assign valid credentials—accessing systems as legitimate users.

These aren’t edge cases — they’re design decisions. And they’re unavoidable as long as the credential belongs to the user, not to the system.

The Bottom Line

The takeaway is clear: today’s login credentials are inherently flawed. They fail because the processes around them are built for user convenience, not resilience. As long as enrollment, reset, and recovery flows ultimately default to user-controlled passwords, PINs, or help-desk overrides, attackers will keep bypassing even the strongest MFA and passkey deployments.